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Sexually violent predator laws: psychiatry in service to a morally dubious
enterprise
Abstract

This article discusses the role of psychiatrists in determining the treatment of sexually violent predators
(SVP). Instead of being released at the end of their prison sentences, sex offenders in the USA who are judged
mentally disordered and dangerous are being confined in secure "treatment facilities" for indeterminate terms.
This novel and aggressive legislative tactic—embodied in US sexually violent predator laws—commandeers
the traditional power of state mental health systems and puts it in service to a core function of the criminal
justice system: the control of sexual violence. This transposition of "civil commitment" has forced psychiatry
to legitimate and arbitrate the boundaries of an aggressive and highly contested form of state coercion. By
their very structure, SVP laws politicize psychiatry in ways that go well beyond the traditional interconnection
between psychiatry and law.
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Instead of being released at the end of their prison
sentences, sex offenders in the USA who are judged
mentally disordered and dangerous are being confined
in secure "treatment facilities" for indeterminate terms.
This novel and aggressive legislative tactic----.embodied
in US sexually violent predator (SVP) lawscommandeers the traditional power of state mental
health systems and puts it in service to a core runction of
the criminal justice system: the control of sexual
1101ence. This transposition of "civil commitment" has
forced psychiatry to legitimate and arbitrate the
houndaries of an aggreSSive and highly contested rorm
or state coercion. By their very structure, SVP laws
politicise psychiatry in ways that go well beyond the
traditional interconnection between psychiatry and law.
SVP laws emerged in the early 1990s to close a newly
!alient "prevention gap" in the control of sexual
,lolence. The prevailing "law and order" mentality
produced heightened societal concern. Conservative
politiCS had abandoned the rehabilitation ideal in the
criminal justice system, replacing release·when·
rehabilitated "indeterminate" sentences with desert·
based "determinate" sentencing. In the late 1980s, the
first round of determinate sentences began to expire,
leaving state officials without the discretion they had
deployed under indeterminate sentences to adjust the
length of confinement to the dangerousness of the
offender.
By the late 1980s, heinous crimes committed by
recen'tly released sex offenders produced a popular call
for more effective protection. Constitutional principles
prahi bited the lengthening of existing penal sentences.
Civil commitment, whose non·penal pedigree exempted
it from these constitutional constraints, was seen as the
only available tool to continue the incarceration of sex
offenders who were deemed "too dangerous to release"
from prison.
Traditionally, civil commitment has been limited to
medically recognised forms of mental illness or mental
retardation that are considered so severe as to grossly
impair an individual's competency to care for himself
and is justified by the state's parens patriae power to
care for those who cannot care for themselves. This
power was constitutionally limited in the 1960s to
circumstances in which the mental impairment
threatened some harm to self or others.
SV P laws are constructed to mimic civil commitment
to partake of constitutiona.l and moral legitimacy. SVP
laws target "mental or personality disorders or
abnormalities" that render the individual predisposed to
commit further sexual crimes. SVP commitments arc

indefinite, although subject to periodic reexamination
by the courts. Although their primary purpose is pubhc
safety, US states claim treatment as the secondary
purpose of these laws.
SVP laws are both legaUy and morally controversial
because they incarcerate individuals in anticipation of
future predicted crimes. Their adoption of the civil
commitment form appears to be iIl.fitting and contrived.
Most sex offenders are not incompetent and do not have
the kinds of psychotic mental impairments that
traditionally have justified civil commitment. SVP laws
arc "preventive detention accomplishing the morall)'
and legally doubtful task of putting the "punishment"
before the crime.
SVP laws politicise psychiatry and the allied
profeSSions in three ways. First, psychiatry and allied
mental health professions are used by SVP laws as a
central prop of legitimacy. The purpose of the laws is
claimed to be legitimate because it is "medically
appropriate" to confine people with "mental disorders'
for treatment in "treatment facilities". SVP laws claim
that their application to individuals is legitimate because
key determinants for confinement are certified by
mental health professionals. The purpose and
application of SVP laws are thereby made to appear
scientific and inevitable, rather than contingent and
political,
Second, the judgments made by professionals in SVP
caseS are largely political; they reRect societal value
judgments, and they are vulnerable to the pressures of
the political process. Professionals judge whether the
individual meets the legal criteria for a diagnosis based
on mental condition and level of risk. These are
questions that involve medical and psychological
judgment and the application of legal thresholds. SVP
experts are asked to calibrate their estimates against th('
legal thresholds for risk, which are expressed
qualitatively using terms such as "likely" or "highly
likely". Because these legal terms arc so indeterminate,
professionals must make political judgments that
determine the balance between public safe!y and
individual liberty.
Similarly, mental health profeSSionals decide whether
individuals meet the legal mental disorder standard,
which requires them to judge whether the disorder
entails "serious difficulty in controlling behavior". This
standard is apparently intended to invoke some notion
of volitional dysfunction, a medically indeterminate
concept of notorious opacity. To apply this standard
professionals must take into account social and expert
judgments.
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Mental health professionals are asked to make the
social judgment as to whether the individual is
dangerous and mentally impaired enough to warrant
long-tenn deprivation of liberty. But it would be naive to
assert that the link between psychiatry and socio-politics
IS an invention of SVP laws. After all, psychiatric debate
about the recognition and definition of psychiatric
diagnoses often turns on social values. And psychiatric
dIagnoses and risk assessments playa ubiquitous role in
the law and other social institutions.
But SVP laws push the politics beyond this normal
range, SVP commitment decisions involve high stakes,
pItting personal liberty against prevention of heinous
crimes. False-negative errors in judgment result in
sexual violence and are thus more visible and politically
dlsvalued than are false positives. The political context is
VIrulent. Citizens protest proposed releases of predators
and politicians scapegoat the mental health
professionals whose judgments were in the chain of
events ending in heinous crimes.
These political pressures are important because the
legal questions posed are vague and the professional
Judgments tap into areas in which the expertise of
mental health professionals is questionable or
underdeveloped. Clinical assessment of risk for longterm recidivism is of questionable accuracy. Although
strides are being made in the development of
empirically based actuarial approaches, these tools
remain rough guides to "group risk". Further, much
remains unknown about assessing the effects of
treatment or supervision on sex offender recidivism, so
decisions about the safety of releasing individuals from
commitment remain substantially unguided.
Even diagnosis is distorted by political pressures.
Almost two decades ago, the American Psychiatric
Association rejected the inclusion of"paraphilic rapism"
or "paraphilic coercive disorder" in the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. Yet these labels
and other non-DSM diagnoses are now appearing with
some frequency in SVP commitment proceedings.
The third way in which SVP laws politicise. psychiatry
is that the mental health infrastructure has been
conscripted in ways that serve the political process, but
are inconsistent with core professional values.
Assessment of sexual dangerousness, even in its most
developed form, is ethically inadequate to the task of
deciding the long-term deprivation of liberty. Mental
health institutions have also had the responsibility

delegated to them for the care and treatment of
committed "predators" despite the pronouncements of
professional organisations that these laws "misallocate
psychiatric facilities and resources [and] constitute an
abuse of psychiatry," and "undermine the mission and
integrity of the public mental health system".
SVP laws respond to powerful popular fears about the
risk of sexual violence. Yet because they lock individuals
away, not in punishment for past crimes, but in
anticipation of uncommitted crimes, these laws threaten
core democratic values and teeter on the verge of
illegitimacy. Despite serious doubt and protest,
psychiatry and its allied professions are recruited to
legitimise the goals of these laws, to approve their
application, and to assume institutional responsibility
for the offenders who are confined.
There are three interrelated dangers here: first, the
"good name of psychiatry is misappropriated to
burnish a morally dubious political enterprise. Second,
psychiatric practice and the use of psychiatric
knowledge are estranged from the profession's own
ethics and values. Third, the political pressures
underlying SVP laws may contaminate what should be
politically neutral scientific judgments. Thus, while
psychiatry is recruited and stretched to serve the
legitimacy of SVP laws, this service may well undermine
psychiatry's own claim to legitimacy.
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